



‘ONSIDERABLE empirical work and a significant,
but considerably smaller, volume of theoretical effort
has been devoted to the question of the short-run,
dynamic adjustment of the demand formoney. Much
of the impetus for the empirical work came from the
classic study by Chow (1966), who employed the par-
tial adjustment model to characterize the adjustment
of actual to desired real money balances.
Although there was early concern over the eco-
nomics of Chow’s specification and its relatively slow
estimated speed of adjustment, this specification did
not come under particularly close scrutiny until the
unanticipated rise in velocityin the mid-1970s and the
decline in velocity in the early 1980s.’ As a result, a
number of alternative dynamic adjustment specifica-
tions have been developed. While these specifications
differ in several fundamental respects, they fall into
two general categories: those that assume the price
level adjusts to exogenous changes in the money stock
and those that assume the nominal money stock ad-
justs to exogenous changes in the price level. Conse-
quently, three fundamentally different, short-mn dy-
namic adjustment processes have been considered in
the literature: the real adjustment specification of
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‘See, for example, Goldfeld (1976), Carr and Darby (1981), Coats
(1982), Laidler (1980, 1982, 1983), Chant (1976), Judd and Scad-
ding (19B2a, 1982b), Hetzel (1984) and Motley (1984).
Chow and the alter-native nominal money and price
adjustment specifications! These specifications have
received considerable attention in the literature, with
much of the empirical work devoted to determining
which of these specifications is most consistent with
the data, for example, Goldfeld (1976), Hafer and Rein
(1980), Judd and Scadding (1982a(, Coats (1983), Mi!-
bourne (1983), Hetzel (1984) and Motley (1984).
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we
review the litet-ature on these specifications and point
out that none of them can be thought of as represent-
ing adequately the short-run adjustment of actual
to desired money when applied to aggregate data.
Second, we demonstrate that none of these three
specifications are directly comparable statistically!
Consequently, the relative performance ofthese alter-
natives can be assessed only by their conformity with
‘Nearly all of the specifications that have been suggested in the
literature fall into one of these basic categories, atleast to theextent
that they have the price level, nominal money or real money as the
dependent variables. Furthermore, many of the specific alternatives
are concerned with how the demand for real money balances ad-
justs to changes in its arguments and, as such, are consistent with
any of the three fundamental adjustment processes considered
here.
‘It has been recognized, especially recently, that these alternatives
are nonnested, i.e., none can be obtained by placing restrictions on
any of the others. Consequently, most studies compare the fore-
casts of real money leg., Hafer and Hem (1980) and Goldfeld
(1976)1, or the residual sum of squares [e.g., Judd and Scadding
(1982a) and Coatsi of alternative models. To date, only Motley
(1984) has recognized that the nominal and price specifications are
not comparable.
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theory and their stability. Finally, we investigate the
performance ofeach specification using the same data
and the same estimation period, lI/1951—ll/1984. ‘I’he
evidence suggests that none of these specifications
have performed well over’the entire period and none
have been stable.
The issue oftemporal stability is particularly impor-
tant if one is to rely on short-run money demand in
formulating short-mn stabilization policy. Iftheshort-
run demand for money is unstable, then attempts to
stabilize output and prices in the short run through
monetary control will be unsuccessful because differ-
ent levels ofoutput and prices will be consistent with
agiven stockof money at different points in time. This
type of short-run instability, however, does not rule
out the usefulness of moneta!y control for achieving
economic stabilization overthe longer run.
DYNAMIC SPECIFICAT.IO.~NSOF
MONEY DEMANI)
All short-run money demand specifications are
based on the long-run demand for money,
lit m” = ftX, a. u,t = IIZ,l,
where m denotes real money balances, X is a set of
endogenous and exogenous variables which usually
includes some measure of real income or wealth and
one or more interest 1-ates, and a is a vector of un-
Imown parameters. The error term is denoted by u.All
variables are in natural logs.
Chow based his short-run specification on the sim-
pie and convenient partial adjustment mechanism,
(2) in, — m,, = Xlrn” 0 C A51
He specified his adjustment process on the basis of
individual economic behaviot, arguing that individ-
uals might adjust their actual stock of real money
balances to the desired level in much the same way as
they might adjust their actual stockofconsumer dura-
bles to their desired level. This specification has been
rationalized in a microeconomic framework in which
the speed of adjustment (A) is determined by the cost
ofbeing out ofequilibrium relative to the cost of mov-
ing to equilibrium lfor example, Motley (1967) and
Feige (1967(1.
‘One could compare the ability of each model to forecast its depen-
dent variable by, say, comparing percentage forecast errors (e.g.,
Hetzel). Such an exercise, while interesting, has little to say about
the demand formoney. Moreover, no objective comparison can be
made, because there is no agreement about which variable is most
important.
The peculiarity of this process was quickly pointed
out by Walters 119671. He noted that, in the aggregate,
market equilibrium requit-es that the demand for teal
money balances equals the supply ofreal money. Ifthe
nominal money stock is exogenous, equilibrium
requires
(3) Ni/C’
where M and P~denote the nominal money stock and
the long-run equilibrium price level, respectively, IfM
is fixed inthe aggregate and the price level is adjusting
to changes in M, equation 2 can be thought of as the
price adjustment equation:
(4) P C,, AIr — P,,I!
The combination of equations 3 and 4 results in a
specification that reflects Walters’ ctiticism of the
Chow model and explicitly represents the so-called
price adjustment specification considered by Gordon
(1984), Laidler 19831, and Hetzel.
Goldfeld (1973, 1976), on the other hand, argued
against Chow’s specification on microeconomic
grounds. lie contended that it is defective because it
implies that an individual adjusts realmoney balances
fully and instantaneously to price level changes, but
only pattially to money demand changes.” As an
alternative, he offemedthenominal adjustment specifi-
cation,
(5) M, Ni,, = A(M~— M,.,I 0< A Si,
where M”denotes the desired level of nominal money.
He argued that equation S makes more sense than
5Substifuting equation 3 into equation 2 and holding M fixed soM, =
M, the resulting expressionis equation 4.
Thereader should note that, while we have not changed notation,
the interpretation of A in equation 4 is fundamentally different from
that of equation 2. The same is true of the interpretation of A in
equation 5 below.
‘This is most easily understood by noting that combining equation 2
with equation I implies not onlythat the long-run demandfor nomi-
nal money is unit elastic with respect to price, but that theshort-run
nominal demand is as well.
This aspect of the real adjustment specification is not odd if one
believes that money and bonds are close substitutes for each other,
i.e., if a strict Keynesian liquidity preference holds, If money and
fixed-dollar-denominated financial assets are held in some desired
proportion given the interest rate, an unanticipated change in the
price level will affect both money and financial assets proportionally
so that an individual’s relative holdings of financial assets and
money will be unaffected. This will hold in either a pure asset model
or in inventory theoretic transactions models. Thus, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that an individual’s demand for real money
holdingsadjusts instantaneously(orat least very quickly) tounantic-
ipatedprice level changes if one believes that the onlylink between
the real and financial sectors is the interest rate.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF Si, L,OU1S MARCH 1985
equation 2, a priori, because the adjustment of nomi-
nalmoney to aprice level change is partial mather than
instantaneous as equation 2 implies!
Gordon also at-gues for the nominal adjustment
specification on microeconomic grounds.’ He main-
tains that theie are no adjustment costs associated
with price-induced changes in real money holdings
and, consequently, the only costs involved in adjust-
ingone’s portfolio are those associated with adjusting
nominal money balances,’
Laidler (1983) notes, however-, that when equation 5
is applied to aggregate data, one commits the fallacy of
composition if the aggregate nominal money stock is
exogenous. Individuals are free to adjust their nomi-
nal balances, but society as a whole is not. Mom-cover,
Hetzel observes that applying equation 5 to aggregate
data is tantamount to assuming that the pt-ice level is
exogenous to an endogenous nominal money stock.
According to this interpretation, the monetary author-
ity supplies the nominal money balances desired by
the public with a lag. In this context, the nominal
adjustment model is viewed as an equation represent-
ing themarket equilibrium, where A is the adjustment
parameter in the so-called Federal Reserve reaction
function rather than the speed of adjustment of
money demand. Given this interpretation, market
equilibi-ium requires
(CI MOP =
whei-e M” denotes the aggregate level of nominal
money balances desired by the public given the price
level, P.
~ri98. SIiO:’t~IIui1Jie;tI;11.c~ahlon.,1/
The above equations can be used to obtain the three
short-run money demand specifications. Equations I
and 2 can be combined directly to obtain
(71 m, = AI1Z,i + Ii —
the real adjustment specification of Chow 1966).
Likewise, we can combine equations 3 with 4, and S
with 6, to obtain what Laidlet- (1983) has termed quasi-
reduced-form equations:
(SI m, = AIIZ,I +I i — AIIM,,., — Pt
and
191 m, = Af(Z,( + Ii — AIIM,— C, ,l.
Because, ostensibly, all of these equations have real
money on the left-hand side, it appears that these
models can be compared using statistical techniques.
This is incorrect.
Note that the equations 8 and 9 could just as wellbe
specified and estimated as
18’i Ni, = AIIZ,( + (i—AIM,., + AP,
and
(9’I C, = — Af{Z,( +I i — AIR,., ±AM,.
‘By the same reasoning, one could argue that the nominal adjust-
ment specification implies that individuals never fully adjust to ex-
pected inflation — see Carr and Darby. Both of these characteriza-
tions may beoff the mark, however. A more reasonable model might
allow both price level and nominal money shocks to affect the
demand for money in the short run, but require them to average out
tozero in the long run. This has been suggestedrecently by Gordon.
For example, let (M~—Pfl= f(Z,) and combine this equation with
equations 4 and 5. The result is an equation that can be estimated
given a further normalization rule: the residual sum of squares can
be minimized in the direction of M, or P,. Unfortunately, the results
are extremelysensitive to the normalization rule, In general, if one
normalizes in the direction of M,, the results are similar to (and often
not statistically distinguishablefrom) thoseof the nominal specifica-
tion, if one normalizes in the direction of F,, the results are similar to
the price adjustment specification. These results areavailable upon
request.
‘itis not clear exactly howGordon means this, Certainly, individuals
are treeonlytoadjust theirnominal money holdings sinceprice must
betaken as given: however.Gordon cites the energy price shock as
his only example. He argues that the supply shock reduces real
income and, hence, the demand for real money (presumably pro-
portionally) so that no portfolio disequilibrium occurs,
‘Using the standard quadratic adjustment cost approach, it can be
shown that the nominal specification results it adjustment costs are
associated only with nominal money and if prices are given. See
Hwang (1984).
Comparing equations 7, 8’ and 9’ reveals that they all
have different dependent variables. Furthermore, no
trivia) transformation exists that will make these equa-
tions comparable; that is, regression equations cannot
be manipulated algebraically to change the left-hand-
side variable to anything one pleases. Therefore, noth-
ing can be said about which specification is preferred
based on comparisons of these specifications, despite
claims to the contraty. (See the appendix for a more
detailed discussion.)
Alternatively, one can note that equations 8’ and 9’
make different assumptions about which vat-iable is
exogenous (i.e., prices and nominal money, respec-
tivelyl. Since, at best, only one of these assumptions is
correct, consistent estimates of the errors can be ob-
tained from only one of these equations. Hence, any
comparison based on the residuals ofthese two speci-
fications is inappropriate. Fut-thermnore, theory alone
cannot serve as a guide because, at the mictoeco-
nomic level, the assumption of exogenous prices
seems most relevant, while in theaggregate the exoge-
neity of nominal money is most plausible.FEOEF,AL RESERVE BANK OF Si. LOUIS MARCH 1985
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Because these alteratives are not statistically com-
parable, each should be evaluated for its consistency
with thetheory and its stability.” Estimates ofthe real,
nominal and price adjustment specifications are pre-
sented in this section. The estimates reported here
cover the period )t/I952—II/1984, which has been di-
vided into three subperiods: II/1951—IV/1961, 1/1962—
IV/1973 and 1/1974—11/1984. This division is somewhat
arbitrary; nevertheless, it has several aspects which
make it desirable. First, the two earlier subperiods
correspond closely to periods for which Goldfeld
(1973) found the basic Chow equation to be stable.
Hence, it will be interesting to compare the estimates
of the nominal and price adjustment specifications
over these periods. Second, [V/I973 marks an observed
break in the nominal and real adjustment specifica-
tions.” Third, all three periods differ rather signifi-
cantly with respect to the growth and variability of
both money and prices.” Finally, during the first two
periods, the Federal Reserve was relying almost exclu-
sively on an interest rate target, while, in the third
period, more consideration was given to monetary
aggregate targets. Hence, we might expect to see some
deterioration in the performance ofthe nominal spec-
ification overthe third period.
The real IR), nominal (N) and price (P( adjustment
equations are estimated with ordinary least squares
(OLS) to facilitate comparisons across time periods.
Durbin’s h-statistic is reported to illustrate how the
error structure has varied among specifications and
through time.” Furthermore, all the equations were
estimated with real money balances on the left-hand
“Consistency with the theory” means that the coefficients should be
statistically significant, correctly signed, and the adjustment coeffi-
cient should obey its restriction. Thus, these equations are inter-
preted (as they have been in the literature) as money demand
equations. It should be noted. however, that since equations8’ and
9’ are really quasi-reduced forms, neither is a particularly likely
equation for explaining the nominal money stock or price level,
respectively. I am indebted to Tom Fomby for this observation, He
noticed that equation 9’ did not capture the monetarist notion of a
long lag from money to prices.
“Hater and Hem (1982) mark the break at V/1973, while Lin and Oh
(1984) record it at Il/i 974.
“The variances (x 100) of M and F, respectively, are (0.3449,
0.4599), (3.2210, 1.8107) and (4.6474, 4.7701) for the three peri-
ods. The simple correlations between M, and F, over these periods
are 0.9601, 0.9947 and 0.9911.
“The equations also were estimated adjusting for first-order serial
correlation using a maximum likelihood, grid-search procedure to
estimate the coefficient of autocorrelation directly. In all instances,
the qualitative conclusions were unaffected by the serialcorrelation
correction.
side, so that the signs of the coefficients are the same
for all specifications.” Also, since the nominal and
price specifications represent over-identified, re-
duced-form equations, the reported F-statistic is for a
test of the over-identifring restrictions; the results re-
ported are for equations with the restriction im-
posed.” Finally, the equations were estimated using
real income (y), the commercial paper rate ICPR) and
the passbook savings rate (PBR) as independent varia-
bles. This specification of long-run money demand
represents a fairly standard version, following Gold-
feld (1973). The equations are estimated with and
without the PBR because numerous studies have
found that similar variables have not been statistically
significant over later periods, for example, Hafer and
Hem (19803, Milbourne and Judd and Scadding
l1982a).
The flireeAdjust:nent I~J~r;IIQ,IS
Estimates of the three adjustment specifications for
the three periods appear in table 1. Neither- the real
nor the nominal specifications performs well in the
earlyperiod unless the PBR is included. Real income is
insignificant in both equations and the over-identi~,-
ing restriction is rejected at a ‘very low significance
level in the nominal specification when the savings
rate is excluded.” Furthermore, both the real and
nominal specifications produce similar estimates of
the coefficients overthis period. The only striking dif-
ference is the apparent first-order serial correlation in
the nominal specification, not present in the real
equation.
Both the real and nominal specifications perform
well in the last two periods in that all the parameters
(savethe constants) are significant and have theantici-
pated sign if the PBR is excluded. Including the PBR
for the 1/1962—IV/1973 period, however, tends to in-
crease the estimated coefficient on real income mark-
edly, while it reduces it in the 1/1974—11/1984 period.
Indeed, real income is insignificant in the real specifi-
cation in the last period ifthe PBR is included.
In contrast with the real and nominal specifications,
real income is not significant in the price adjustment
specification in the first period. Furthermore, it is sig-
‘~Theadjusted A’s are calculated for their respective dependent
variable, however.
“The over-identifying restriction forthenominalspecification 8’ is that
the coefficients on M,., and F, sum to one, The over~identifying
restriction for this price specification is that the coefficients on F,.,
and M, sum to one,
“Thet-tests are one-tailed ifthe coefficient has an anticipated sign,
two-tailedotherwise.
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Table 2
Likelihood Ratio Test Results
Tests ofEquality ofParameters
Periods 1 and 2 Periods 2 and 3
Specification PBA No PBR PBFR No FBR
Fl 9 61 20.90’ 22 82’ 22 48’
N 555 13.63’ 1030 943
P 670 273 4228’ 12.25’
Tests ofEquality ofVariances
Periods 1 and 2 2 and 3
Specification PBR No PBA PBR No PBR
A 010 001 265~ 2377’
N 184 049 20.0r 1767’
P 5.7T 467’ 1348’ 11.97’
siqnificant at the 5 percent level
Critical values \. (11 3 84.
)~, ~
- ~ - 1107.
niticant in the second period, ,ut only ii thepas~iook
rate is included, and, in the third period, only if the
PBR is excluded. In this instance, the PBR enters %vith
the wrong sign. Finally, theover-identifying restriction
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level during the
first two periods in the price specification, but is re-
jected for the 1/1974—11/1984 period.
It is interesting to note that, although r-eal income is
not significant in the price equation in the first period
(or in the second if the PBR is excluded), the standard
error from this specification is lower than that of ei-
ther the real or- nominal specifications. Ifone thought
that all these equations had the same dependent vari-
able, one would conclude incorrectly that the price
equation is the preferred specification.” Moreover, the
results are inconsistent with Laidler’s (1983) conjec-
ture that these equations are so similar that, if either
the real or nominal specifications perfolms well, then
so will the price specification.”
“Hence, it is not surprising that Coats and Judd and Scadding
(1 982a) concluded that these specifications are preferred.
“In fairness to Laidler, he goes ontoargue that none ofthese specifi-
cations is likelyto be stable over time, aconjecture thatour empirical
results support.
Furthermore, much of the apparent instability in
these specifications is associated with the scale varia-
ble, the constant term, the PBR and the standard en-or
itself, rather than with the CPR or the adjustment
coefficient.
.t’Orr/iai 149877 ISA Pt 177
In order to test the stability of these specifications
through time, likelihood ratio tests were performed on
general specifications that allowed for- differences in
the variances of the equation and the coefficient of
autocorrelation as well as the structural parameters.”
The results of tests of the equality of the coefficients
and variances are presented in table 2. The results
suggest that Goldfeld’s (1973) conclusion about the
stability ofthereal specification over thefirst two peri-
ods is critically dependent upon the specification of
the long-run demand for money. If the PBR is in-
cluded, the null hypothesis that the structur-al param-
eters are stablecannot be rejected. Ifit is excluded, the
hypothesis is rejected. Furthermore, the hypothesis of
structural stability between the second and third pen-
ods is rejected for the real specification regardless of
whether the PBR is included.
The price adjustment specification does not fare
much better. While the null hypothesis ofthe equality
of thestructural parameters cannot be rejected for the
first two periods, the insignificance of real income in
either period makes the result oflittle interest. More-
over, thehypothesis is rejected decisively in acompar-
ison of the last two periods.
The results for the nominal specification are more
encouraging. The null hypothesis is rejected during
the first period only ifthe PBR is excluded. Mor-e im-
portantly, the hypothesis is not re;ected at the S per-
“It is well known that the standard F-test for structural stability is
sensitive to heteroscedasticity. See Toyoda (1974) and Schmidt
and Sickles (1977). Thus, likelihood ratio tests were constructed to
allow for heteroscedasticity. This procedure is complicated by the
presence ofstatistically significant serial correlation across some of
the partitions. This was handled by obtaining maximum likelihood
estimates of the coefficient ot autocorrelation over each partition.
Thetests were conductedwith the model transformed appropriately
to adjust serial correlation, if there was no statistically significani
autocorrelation in a subperiod, theuntransformed data were used, If
there was prior evidence of serial correlation, the Frais-Winsten
transformation was used, If there was no evidence of prior serial
correlation, the initial observation was included unweighted [see
Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984), p. 213, and Thornton (1934)).
Maximum likelihood estimatesofthe restricted modeiwere obtained
using an iterative procedure. The resulting likelihood ratio statistics
are asymptotically distributed X’(J), where J is the number of
restrictions.Table 3
Estimates for the 1/1974—11/1984 Period With Dummy Variablesfor Credit Controls
Specification
Variable R NP
constant 141 .155 102 .099 081 100
(052) f054) 1046j f045) l0591 1061)
y 047 .095’ 050’ 048 003 052’
(1 50~ f5.02j fl 93) (3 17; (018) (4 SBj
CFR 023’ .022 009’ 009’ 015’ 013’
1516 ~4771 (2411 (247) 16351 4.921
FBA 133 006 148
189) to11) l4lOl
M. . F 933’ 910
(20.181 (1971)
M R .96V 9677
(2491) (2564)
M. F. 978’ 952’
(4071) (34.25)
Dummy 111980 038’ - 036’ 028’ 02& 010’ 010
(
466
J ~435~ (4271 t
435
1 12.50) ri gi~
Dummy III 1980 011 .012 .019’ 019’ .007 006
(137) (1.40) 279) ‘283i (178) 11231
SE - 10- 7935 8214 6518 6427 4057 4868
.9253 .9200 9991 .9991 9997 9995
ii 267 811 400 414 528 2713’
coeflicieniequality 27.44’ 24.59’ 10 19 930 4845’ 13.87’
Vanance equality 1244’ 1173’ 7 04 556’ 8677 10 62’
Absolute value of the t-slatrstics in parentheses ‘Significant at 5 percent level
ei’irl Ie% el dun i~the latter’ period re~.trdlessii
t the ~ai’IarH e 01 roth tIn’ real and rlorn1nah ~pi’cdiralirum
sperihuatron I he list statisirt’ is honierin’ ho~~.e~ej’ni~nhi’ doe to r-nedil rontrols. (n~eo the inpi tanie iii
espi’eilI’’ whi’ri the P11K is eu’luded I iiriher’iiior’t’ lieterosr’edistreit~ ri tests 01 p,ti ~tnLt’ter stahjlit~ ii is
there is a sigriilieantirinr’ease iii the uiniani’i’ ot tire inipni’tant that this iOssihrhil\ Ire aceonriled Rn lhns
speertinattori as ~~etIas a marked change in the serial credit eontr’nl dunini~~anrahlestoil! I lIMO and lii I IMII
correlation of the er’nhr’ 5lnictnre I hese results ire ~ nr~1tit1i’tl ~il ~l)eiitieZttiofls I liet l,~ele in—
ncrnsisteiiI ‘uth rice nt Iindrrigs ot [in aircl Oh. I hits it eluded in the price s1reeiti ation irut r,t erirnrsil\ 5 net’
appears that this specitiration has changed Iii some a prior: it is ditlicult to delermine their ellen oh he
ILiirdamental ~av during the las! period P~’1’~’ level.
Oi.S estinl,ites or these erItittions ton the third pe-
riod appear in tahle:t the likelihood natioslatistins or’
‘II three speciliratiohls indicate a sigulliranit in tests ut the equalit~ot the parameters atrii tariatir Ps
cruise in the~inianreolthe eqrialion dw’ing thi Litter o~er’the last un periods also appear Including (lit’
period. Item tli,S2i has presented sortie e\ iderice that reedit eontnrrl duinnrr~\ariatnless’Lrhstantiali\ Ion u’red
tlus change may he due in part to the credit u’onirols ot the estimated standard error’s mr the real and noirirnal
ItIStI, more recently. Gordon and tinier arid l’horntrrrr specrliratirrns. as aolrriputed. houe~er the rednrtroir
I UM.1 line shot~ n that the eredil contrrris had a slatis br the price specilir’alion rot surprIsrngl~ is not as
lirall~sigriilirant imirpact on t’on~entioriilrurini’\ rh— lange Both eredit u onlr’ol dLirrlrrn ~,oi,ihles are sittnifl—
miramrd l.rltlZutiotis. hlurir’i’. this mir~ur’eciirir’r’u’as’ ir the can! in the ironnrn.il sperrtiu’ation rriuglrl~equal inF MARCH 19SF
Table 4
Estimates of the Nominal Specification
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t the t-stalistics n parentheses ‘Significant al 5
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magnitude and oppt r~ite in sign. Only thefirst dummy
variable is significant in either the real or pricespecifi-
cations; its coefficient in the real money specification
is approximately equal to the sum ofthe coefficients
of the nominal money and price ‘adjustment speci~
fications -
Despite the obvious importance of the credit con-
trols to these specifications, especially the nominal’
one, the conclusions of thestability tests arenot differ-
ent from those reported in table 2. Consequently, the
credit controls had no effect on the outcome of tests
for structural stability.
:ickauw•naz
The performance of these equations is greatly af-
fected by the presence or absence of the P1111. In par-
ticular, it bears greatly on the tests of the stability of
the structural coefficients of the nominal and real
specifications. The hypothesis of stability is rejected
over the first two periods and is borderline over the
last two periods if this variable is excluded. Further-
more, the switch of the PBR itself from statistical sig-
nificance to insignificance might be considered evi-
dence of instability. The sensitivity of these specifica-
tions to the PBRcould have asound economic basis or
be a mere statistical artifact. if the latter is correct, it
would appear that these specifications have been con-
siderably less stable temporally than is generally sup-
posed. Consequently, the role of this variable deserves
additional attention.
Overmost of’the estimation period considered here,
MI was composed primarily of non-interest-bearing
demand deposits and currency. Consequently, one
could argue that the PBR constituted ,an important
opportunity cost variable — especially over the first
two periods — and that the equations are serious1
misspecified if this variable is excluded. In the last
period, however, the P1311 might be considered aproxy
for the own rate, as interest-bearing transaction ac-
counts (paying explicit rates close to the P13111 made up
a large part of Ml.”
In order to test this explanation, Mi less other
checkable deposits (OCD} was used in place of Ml in
the nominal specification over the last period. This
measure corresponds closely to the old currency-
plus-demand-deposits definition of money. If the
above conjecture is correct, this specification should
perform well in the sense that both real income and
the P1311 should entem’significantly. Ifthe performance
is poor, either there has been an underlying shift in
money demand in the most recent period or money
demand has neverbeen stable.
This approach is limited by the factthat the propor-
tion of demand deposits held by individuals declined
after the nationwide introduction of NOWaccounts in
1981. This could bias the results for estimates over the
entire 1/1974—11/1984 period. Thus, the adjusted Ml
measure was estimated for the entire third period and
for the subperiod I/1974—IV/1980/’ The results, re-
ported in table 4, show that neither the PBR nor real
income enter significantly in this equation for either
time period. Furthermore, the adjustment coefficient
is negative, indicating an unstable dynamic specifica-
tion. The results are not consistent with the conjec-
ture that the P1311 represents a critical variable in the
long-run demand for money. Thus, the conclusion
that none of the short-run money demand specifica-
tions havebeen stable is more attractive.
2oThe P8k might not be a good proxy for the own rate on NOW
accounts over this period because it does not account for service
charges associated with these deposits.
“The real and price specifications were estimated but not reported.
Also, the equations usingadjusted Ml were estimated over the first
two periods but are not reportedbecause they differ little from those
reported in table 1.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUiS MARCH 1885
SL1~’1MAHY ANt) CONCLUSJONS
This article has dealt with alternative specifications
ofthe short-run demand for money. Ithas pointed out
that, although three basic forms of the dynamic ad-
justment of money demand have been compared in
the literature, they are not strictly amenable to statisti-
cal testing. The specifications were estimated for three
subperiods over the period Il/1951—Il/1984. It was
found that Ii) all three specifications arevery sensitive
to whether the passbook savings rate is included, (2)
none produce results consistent with economic the-
ory for all three periods and (3) none exhibit temporal
stability. While, strictly speaking, the hypothesis of
temporal stability could not be rejected at the 5 per-
cent level for Goldfeld’s nominal money adjustment
specification for the last two periods, it could be re-
jected at a slightly higher significance level. Further-
more, the variance of this specification and the serial
correlation of the error structure changed signifi-
cantly in thelast period.
Moreover, the stability test results for both the nom-
inal and real adjustment specifications over the first
two periods depend critically on including the pass-
book savings rate in the specification of long-run
money demand. Subsequent investigation produced
results that raise questions about the role the pass-
book rate has played in money demand. Ifthe perfor-
mance ofthe passbook rate in the firsttwo suhperiods
is merely astatistical quirk, then, contrary to common
belief, neither of these specifications is stable over
these periods.
The instability of these particular specifications is
not too surprising when it is recognized that they
represent reduced forms of the d namic adjustment
of money and prices, rather than structural money
demand equations. Consequently, while these specifi-
cations are standard in the literature, their instability
may say little about the instability of money demand.
Thus, our results cast doubt on the usefulness of these
specifications for short-run monetary control, without
indicting money demand in general or usefulness of
monetary control for short-run economic stabiliza-
tion. In any event, the instability of these equations
certainly does not preclude the usefulness of mone-
tary growth targets in achieving longer-run economic
stability.
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APPENIJIX
The purpose of this appendix is to show that equa-
tions 7, 8 and 9 minimize the residual sum of squares
in different directions and, because ofthis, the resid-
uals from these specifications are not statistically
comparable. This appendix draws heavily on the work
of Chow f1964). Consider the standard regression
model
Y = X 13 +
where Y is aThy 1 vector ofthe dependent variable, X
isaThy k matrix ofindependent variables, 1~ is akby 1
vector ofunknown parameters and u is aT by 1 vector
of random errors. It is now commonly understood
that the least squares estimate of the vector- 13 is
geometrically the particular linear combination of the
regressor variables that minimizes the squared dis-
tance between thevector I and the space spanned by
the columns of X. It is less well known that this esti-
mate is obtained by imposing a particular direction
and scale normalization rule. To see this, consider’ the
more general model
3,1, + 13,1, = ~i,X,+ ~s,X,+ u,
where I,, I,, X, and X, are T by I vectors with scalar
parameters
13
k, 13~’p., and p.,. Chow notes that estimates
of the parameters of this model could be obtained by
least squares by projecting the linear combination of
the Y’s(that is, f3,Y, + 13,1,) on the space spanned by X,
Thornton, Daniel L. “On the Treatment of the Initial Observation in
the AR(1)Regression Model,” Federal Reserve Bankof St. Louis
Working Paper No. 84-003(1984).
Toyoda, Toshihisa. “Use ofthe Chow Test UnderHeteroscedastic-
ity,” Econornetrica (May 1974), pp. 601—08.
Walters, A. A. “The Demand For Money — The Dynamic Properties
of the Multiplier,” Journal of Political Economy (June 1967), pp.
293—98.
and X,.In this case, least squares estimates would be
obtained by projecting the vector 131Y, + 13,1, in the
direction of (X,XJ. This would establish the direction-
normalization. Once this is accomplished, the scale
can be obtained by choosing any scale-normalization
for example, 13,13,’ p., or p.. = 1). In this case, direction-
normalization and scale-normalization are separate.
Chow points out, however, that ifthe restriction 13, = I
were imposed before the minimization, the vector I,
alone is projected on the space spanned by (I, X, XJ.
That is, the analyst isasserting that thevector I,, has a
mean vector in the space fY, X, X,) and an additive
random error orthogonal to the space spanned by (I,
X X2). Alternatively, if the restriction 13. = I were im-
posed, the least squares estimates would be obtained
byprojecting thevector I, on the space spanned by (I,
X, X,). This would imply that the analyst viewed I, as
having a mean vector in the space 1, X, X,) and an
additive random error vector orthogonal to (I, X, X,l.
Clearly, the residual vectors obtained from these
different orthogonal projections are in general differ-
ent random variables and are, therefore, not compara-
ble. The same is true of error vectors from equations 7,
Sand 9.We can establish this by noting that minimiza-
tion is obtained after imposing different restrictions
(normalization rules). Forexample, the implicit coef-
ficient on fM—P) is set equal to one in equation 7.
Likewise, the coefficients on M, and P, respectively, are
set equal to one in equations S and 9.
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